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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The organization of professional sports in the United States diﬀers from the one in
Europe in that for each sport, there is one main league (NBA for basketball, MLB
for baseball, NFL for American football and NHL for hockey).1 Consequently, since
the movement of talent across the Atlantic is negligible, leagues in the United States
enjoy a monopsony position in the market for talent. Thus, when American teams
compete to attract the best players, only the distribution of talent is aﬀected, while
the total amount of talent in the league stays constant.
Conversely, Europe is characterized by one main sport (football) and in each
country there is a top domestic league (Premiership in England, Ligue 1 in France,
Serie A in Italy, Liga in Spain, ...). As a result, European leagues can increase their
total amount of talent (and hence, their attractiveness to broadcasters) by poaching
star players from a foreign league. An illustration of this is the concentration of
French players from the Euro-2000-winning squad in England and Italy (15 out of
22) during the season 2000-2001, countries where broadcast revenues are much higher
than in France (See Table 3).2 Therefore, in Europe, not only the teams but the
l e a g u e sa sw e l lh a v ei n c e n t i v e st oc o m p e t ef o rt a l e n t .
Another diﬀerence between the United States and Europe is the revenue sharing
rules used by the leagues. In the United States, revenues from national TV deals
are shared in an egalitarian way. As Scully (1995) explains, “National rights are
evenly split among the clubs in the leagues without regards to the performance of
particular clubs. It is assumed that these shared revenues are determined by league-
1As pointed out by Cave and Crandall (2001), “T h eN F L ,M L B ,N B Aa n dt h eN H Lc u r r e n t l y
have no professional competitors in their respective sports. These dominant positions have existed
for at least two decades. Although entry by new leagues has been quite common in earlier decades,
only one new league has been formed in the past 20 years.”
2Further evidence of the enhanced attractiveness of leagues with the highest concentration of star
players (Italy, Spain and England) is that top games from the Italian, Spanish and English leagues
are broadcasted in France (Canal+, Sport+) and in the Netherlands (Canal+, RTL5).
2wide talent levels.”3 In contrast, in Europe, in countries in which TV rights are sold
collectively, the amount a team receives is closely related to its results obtained in
the competition405 (see Tables 1 and 2).
The goal of this paper is to show that the use of performance-based reward schemes
by European football leagues can be explained by the competitive environment in
which they operate. Conversely, the traditional argument of a demand for a balanced
distribution of talent does not in itself explain the equal division rule used in the
United States.
The intuition for our result is the following. If inter-league movements of players
are not restricted and league-wide talent levels inﬂuence the revenue leagues get from
national TV deals, then leagues compete for superstar players. However, they cannot
do it in a direct way, since players are hired by teams. Hence, a league wishing to
attract top players must provide the incentives for domestic teams to bid a higher
price than foreign teams. Now, the value of a player who increases the probability
of winning increases with the amount awarded to the winner. Hence, a performance-
based reward increases the price domestic teams are willing to bid for top players.
By the above argument, one could rush to the conclusion that competing leagues
3National TV revenue sharing is also analyzed by Fort and Quirk (1995). As they explain,
“national TV contracts in all sports uniformly involve equal sharing of such revenues by all league
teams (with some negotiated, temporary exclusion for expansion franchises). In a one-team-one-
vote environment, equal sharing is more or less guaranteed because the national contract can be
approved only if there is a virtual consensus among league teams. Weak-drawing teams can block
unequal sharing proposal by refusing to permit televising of games involving them and strong-drawing
teams.”
4There is also less revenue sharing of gate income in European football leagues than in most the
of US sports leagues. For example, in England and Italy, there is no sharing of gate income while
in Germany only 6% of gate income is paid to the league. In the NFL, 40% of net gate income goes
to the visiting team. In baseball, 10% and 20% of g a t ei n c o m eg o e s tt ot h ev i s i t i n gt e a mi nt h e
National League and in the American League, respectively.
5In England, the redistribution scheme also takes into account the number of times a team has
been broadcasted.
3should choose a winner-takes-all reward scheme. There are two reasons why this is
not so. First, by increasing the winner’s share the league makes it more diﬃcult
for the team who does not obtain a star player to attract the services of a “good”
player. Second, the price paid for the star player is increasing in the share of the
championship winner, since it increases the valuations of both domestic teams who
t h e nb i du pt h ep r i c e .
A special feature of our model is the bidding mechanism we posit for the com-
petitive allocation of talent, which is closely related to recent work on auctions with
externalities (see Jehiel and Moldovanu, 1996 and 2000, and Jehiel et al., 1996).
These auctions are characterized by interdependent valuations, where a bidder does
not only care about winning, but also about who gets the object in case she does not
win. In our model, if the winner of the auction is from the same league, then losing
is not as harmful, since even though the team gets a smaller share, the total revenue
of the league will remain high. However, if the winner is from the other league, the
loss with respect to winning the auction is much higher, since the aggregate talent
level of the league decreases.
Several papers have studied the inﬂuence of revenue sharing on the demand for
sport (El Hodiri and Quirk, 1971, Atkinson, Stanley and Tschirhart, 1988, Fort
and Quirk, 1995, Vrooman, 1995) or on the demand for players (K´ esenne, 2000,
Booth, 2002). However, they focus on the optimality of cross subsidies as used in the
monopsonistic6 economy of the United States and do not study the implications of
performance-based revenue sharing rules on inter-league competition for players.
The papers most related to ours are those of Hoehn and Szymanski (1999),
Palomino and Rigotti (2000) and Szymanski (2001). As our model, Hoehn and Szy-
6Fort and Quirk (1995) do address the issue of rival leagues in the US context. However, their
main conclusion is that the existence of competing leagues has been a transitory phenomenon, and
the proﬁt motives have always led either to a merger or to an exit. In Europe, at least to date,
because of the national nature of the leagues, steady state rivalry is feasible. Note however, that the
introduction of the Champions’ League was a move in the same direction.
4manski compare a league operating in a competitive environment and an isolated
one. They study the impact of the participation of top clubs in international compe-
titions on the competitive balance of the domestic leagues. They do not address the
issue of the optimal level of revenue sharing. Palomino and Rigotti (2000) consider a
multi-period situation in which the demand for sport depends on the aggregate talent
level, competitive balance and the eﬀort produced by teams. They show that demand
maximization does not lead to full revenue sharing, since even though revenue sharing
fosters competitive balance among teams, it also lowers their incentives to win (and
hence their equilibrium level of eﬀort).
Szymanski (2001) considers an isolated league and studies the impact of several
types of reward schemes on proﬁt and investment in talent. He ﬁnds that teams’
proﬁts and investment in talent are increasing and decreasing, respectively, in the
level of revenue sharing. Also, when a source of revenue that is sensitive to the
level of competitive balance (such as broadcast income) is used to fund a prize, then
performance-based reward may lead to a less balanced competition.
Finally, our model is related to other spheres of the economic activity. First,
i tc a nb es e e na sa ne x a m p l eo fg a m e sp l a yed through agents studied by Prat and
Rustichini (2003). The main diﬀerence between the sport competition we consider
and their more “standard” framework is that the reward scheme the leagues propose
cannot be based on the identity of the teams which attract star players. It can only
based on the outcome of the competition. That is, a team that paid a high price to
attract star player but which happens to lose in the competition will be rewarded less
than a team without star player which eﬀectively won the competition, though the
team with star players contributed more to league-wide talent.
Second, our model is related to some of those on competition for capital or foreign
direct investment. In this respect, our model can be seen as an extension of Huber
(1996) and Naylor and Santoni (2003). Huber considers a situation in which small
open countries decide tax rates on wages income and capital, and where price-taking
ﬁrms compete for internationally mobile capital.
5Our model can be reinterpreted along these lines as one in which large countries
choose tax rates (hence take into account how other countries respond to their ﬁscal
actions), and oligopolistic ﬁrms compete for international capital.
Naylor and Santoni (2003) develop a 3-stage game played by two ﬁrms based in
two diﬀerent countries, and without international trade of goods by ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst
stage, ﬁrms decide whether to make a foreign direct investment (i.e., open a plant) in
the other country. Then, trade unions (with a preference for employment) and ﬁrm
managers negotiate wages at the plant level. In the last stage production takes place.
Along these lines, our model can be understood as one in which in the ﬁrst stage
industry-wide wage negotiation takes place, and then ﬁrms decide the location of their
plants and their production level. With respect to Naylor and Sandroni’s model, the
union’s strategy has a double impact on employment in our model: the level of foreign
direct investment (i.e, the number of plants in a country) and the production level in
each plant.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 considers the case of isolated leagues. Section 4 analyses the competition between
leagues and Section 5 argues the robustness of our results. Finally, Section 6 con-
cludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We present the simplest possible model that still enables us to address the issue of
optimal revenue sharing when there is (potential) competition for players between
leagues.7 There are two leagues, a and b. Each league is made up of two teams, tj,1
and tj,2 (j = a,b). Each team is composed of one player and teams of the same league
compete in a championship.
There are ﬁve potential players: two players of (relatively) low talent (l)t w o
7In the Discussion, we will argue that our ﬁndings are robust to generalizations of this model.
6players of a medium level of talent (m) and one player of high talent (h). The quality
of the players inﬂuences the probability that a team wins the competition. If both
teams in a league are of the same level, their probability of winning the championship
is 1/2e a c h .Ah-team opposed to a l-team wins the championship for certain,8 while
Prob{m wins against l}=P r o b {h wins against m}= π
with π ∈ (1/2,1).
Leagues sell the rights to broadcast the competition to TV networks and the price
networks are willing to pay depends on the quality of the competition, i.e., the level
of competitive balance and the quality of the players involved in the league. The level
of competitive balance is measured by the uncertainty of a competition. The closer
are the probabilities of winning of the two competing teams, the larger is the level
of competitive balance. Hence, leagues with two teams of the same quality are the
most balanced (since the probabilities of winning are equal, 1/2) while a league with
a h team and a l team is the least balanced (since the diﬀerence between the winning
probabilities is 1).
Let K(q1,q 2) be the price paid by a network if the two teams participating in a
league are of quality q1 and q2.W em a k et h ef o l l o w i n ga s s u m p t i o n
K(h,m) >K (m,m) >K (m,l) >K (h,l)=K(l,l)=0
The inequalities K(h,m) >K (m,m)a n dK(m,l) >K (l,l)m e a nt h a ta ni n c r e a s e
in skills dominates a decrease in competitive balance, provided that the resulting
level of competitive balance is not too low. The inequality K(m,l) >K (h,l)m e a n s
that an increase in skills is dominated by a decrease in competitive balance when
the resulting level of competitive balance is very low. Finally, K(h,l)=K(l,l)=0
is a normalization, meaning that there is practically no demand for games with no
uncertainty or games played only by low-quality players.9
8This is just a simplifying assumption.
9Our model thus ﬁts Rosen’s (1981) deﬁnition of Superstars: a small percentage of an already
reduced ﬁeld of agents who are responsible for most of the traded volume.
7Each league splits its broadcasting revenues between the winner and the loser of
the championship it organizes. We denote αj ≥ 1/2 the share which is awarded to
the winner. Thus, αj measures the level of revenue sharing chosen by league j.T h e
two extreme cases are αj =1 /2a n dαj =1 , which correspond to the league choosing
full revenue sharing — thus not rewarding the teams on the basis of their performance
— and to a contest, where the winner takes all, respectively.
Following Atkinson, Stanley and Tschirhart (1988), we assume that, in order to
set the revenue sharing rule, a league behaves as a cartel of the teams involved in the
championship whose objective is to maximize the teams’ joint proﬁt.10 Note that the
maximization of joint proﬁts means that, in addition to its revenue from TV deals
(K), a league also internalizes the cost that obtaining talent inﬂicts on its teams.11
In addition to the collusive behavior in setting the revenue shares the teams also
compete with each other on two levels.12 First, they compete in an auction to attract
the players. Second, they compete “on the ﬁeld” with the other team from the same
league. Their objective is to maximize their expected proﬁt.
We consider the following sequence of events: Leagues a and b choose simultane-
ously their level of revenue sharing αa and αb, respectively. Teams observe αa and αb
and simultaneously make salary oﬀers to h . Following Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996),
in order to obviate existence issues, we assume that there is a smallest monetary unit
ε. h accepts the highest bid.13 If several teams make the highest bid, h chooses
a team randomly. Next, the losing teams bid simultaneously for the ms. The two
10In practice, the governing body of a league is comprised of one voting representative from each
member club and major issues must be approved by majority or supermajority vote. (See Flynn
and Gilbert, 2001). Here, we implicitly assume that the maximisation of the joint proﬁts has been
approved as the objective of the league and its implementation has been delegated to a commissioner.
11In the Discussion, we explain how our results change if this assumption is relaxed.
12This coexistence of collusion and competition is a distinguishing feature of the sports industry.
13Note that this mechanism is not optimal for the h player: he could extract more rent in a menu
auction (see Bernheim and Whinston, 1986), where the losing teams of the same league as the winner
would also pay for the positive externality created by the h player’s presence in the league.
8highest bidders get an m. Finally, the team still without a player is allocated one l at
zero cost (since it is the only bidder in the auction). Once the teams are composed,
the championships take place.
3 The benchmark case: an isolated league
As a benchmark, we consider the case in which there is only one league, whose
(two) teams are bidding for players from the entire pool of potential players.14 This
corresponds to the case of US sports leagues, which face no outside competition for
players.
In a closed economy, when deciding how much to bid for the acquisition of h,a
t e a mk n o w st h a ti fi td o e sn o ta c q u i r eh, then its opponent will. Also, the loser of
the ﬁrst auction will obtain the services of an m for free. Hence, for any α ≥ 1/2, the
value of h is
V (α)=( πα+( 1− α)(1 − π))K(h,m) − (π(1 − α)+α(1 − π))K(h,m). (1)
The ﬁrst term represents the gain of a h-team when opposed to a m-team while the
second term represents the expected gain of a m-team when opposed to a h-team.
Note that V (α) can be rewritten as
V (α)=( 2 α − 1)(2π − 1)K(h,m) ≥ 0. (2)
When a league is isolated, its revenue is independent of the level of revenue sharing
it chooses. However, the level of revenue sharing does aﬀect the price paid for h.
Therefore, the league chooses the value of α that minimizes the transfer from the
teams to the players.
Proposition 1 When the league’s objective is to maximize the joint proﬁts of teams,
it sets α∗ =1 /2.
14Our result would be unaltered if we reduced the pool of potential players, as long as there was
one preferred over the rest (e.g. {h,m(,l)} or {m,l(,l)}).
9Proof: Since the revenues are constant, the league wants to minimize the price
paid for h. Since both teams value him at V (α) this will be the price as well, and the
result follows directly from the fact that V (α)i si n c r e a s i n gi nα. •
Hence, an isolated league representing the team owners will choose full revenue
sharing even in the absence of any competitive balance consideration.
In our simple model, this solution would leave the teams without an incentive
to win and, therefore, star players would earn the same salary as regular players.
This extreme result is due to the fact that we have not taken into account additional
performance-related revenues for the teams like merchandising, part of gate revenues,
or local TV deals, which are not re-allocated by the league. Also in North America
player unions are much stronger than in Europe, what can lead — ceteris paribus —t o
higher player salaries. In addition, it is widely recognized that teams (both owners
and players) have non-pecuniary incentives to win as well. Note, however, that the
formal inclusion of these eﬀects into the model would not change the revenue sharing
result.
4 Competition between leagues
In this section, we consider the case where there are two leagues that compete for the
same pool of players. Thus, all four teams are bidding for the services of the players.
A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h el e a g u e s ’c h o i c e so ft h el evels of revenue sharing are transformed
from two independent decision problems into a non-cooperative game, where we look
for Nash equilibria. Before turning to the leagues’ problem, we need to characterize
the equilibrium of the sub-game following an arbitrary pair of revenue-sharing rules,
so that we can identify the leagues’ payoﬀ functions.
When bidding for h, a crucial concern of a team is whether its adversary is expected
to obtain the services of an m.D e n o t e b y V (m|y,α)t h ev a l u eo fa nm t oat e a m
whose adversary has a y player (y = h,m,l). If V (m|h,αa) ≥ V (m|m,αb), then the
10teams of league a know that upon obtaining h they will play in a (h,m)-league, hence
sharing the gross amount K(h,m).15 In such a case, the teams from league b will
share the gross amount K(m,l). Conversely, if V (m|h,αa) <V(m|m,αb), then the
teams of league a know that upon obtaining h they will play in a (h,l)-league, so
t h e yw i l ln o tw a n tt om a k eap o s i t i v eb i df o rh.
Assume that team ta,1 gets h. Then, the value of an m to team ta,2 is
V (m|h,αa)=[ π(1 − αa)+( 1− π)αa]K(h,m), (3)




K(m,m) − [π(1 − αb)+( 1− π)αb]K(m,l). (4)
It follows that V (m|h,αa) ≥ V (m|m,αb)i se q u i v a l e n tt o
αb ≤
πK(m,l) − 1
2K(m,m)+[ π +( 1− 2π)αa]K(h,m)
(2π − 1)K(m,l)
. (5)
Denote by f(αa) the right-hand side of this inequality as a function of αa.N o t e
that, since π > 1/2, f(αa) is strictly decreasing in αa. It is straightforward to verify








Note that α∗(π) strictly decreases with π. Consequently its lowest possible value
is at α∗(1) = 1 −
K(m,m)
2[K(m,l)+K(h,m)] > 1/2.
Proposition 2 Let ¯ α(π)=m i n {α∗(π),1}. The unique symmetric subgame-perfect
equilibrium has both leagues set ¯ α(π) as the revenue-sharing rule.
15To see this, note that —by symmetry— the teams of the league which does not have h either both
get an m player or neither of them does. No tie — and thus random assignment — is possible, since
when V (m|h,αa)=V (m|m,αb), then the b-league teams actually have a lower valuation, exactly
because of the probability that they might end up as an (m,l) league.
11Proof: First, assume that α∗(π) < 1. The proof is based on Figure 1, which
depicts f(.)a n df−1(.) in the space of strategic variables: (αa,αb) ∈ [1/2,1]× [1/2,1].
Note that both f(.)a n df−1(.) are continuous and strictly decreasing. It is straightfor-
ward to show that we always have f−1(1/2) <f(1/2) and that the condition α∗(π) < 1
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Figure 1
By (5), given a pair (αa,αb), if league a obtains h then it will also obtain an m if
and only if αb ≤ f(αa). By the same token, if league b obtains h then it will also obtain
an m if and only if αa ≤ f(αb), or αb ≤ f−1(αa). Therefore, we have four regions,
with the lower as above (denoted by (Ha,Hb) on Figure 1), the upper with neither
league wanting h (¯ Ha,¯ Hb), while the other upper left is where only league a wants him
(Ha,¯ Hb) and the lower right where only league b does (¯ Ha,Hb). Note the latter two
regions involve asymmetric revenue sharing rules, so a symmetric equilibrium cannot
be there.
Consider the case (Ha,Hb). Here, all teams are willing to bid up to their valuation,
s ot h el e a g u ew h o s et e a m sh ave it higher will obtain h. Next, note that if a team
obtains h in equilibrium, this is also beneﬁcial to the league, since the team internalizes
16Note that α = f(α) ⇐⇒ f−1(α)=α and therefore the two curves intersect at α∗.
12t h ec o s tb u tn o ta l lt h eb e n e ﬁt. Now, if team ta1 obtains h, then in the bid-for-m
stage, the unique equilibrium is such that team ta2 bids V (m|l,αb)+ε,t e a m sf r o m
league b bid V (m|l,αb), and team ta2 gets an m,w h e r e 17
V (m|l,αb)=[ παb +( 1− αb)(1 − π)K(m,l)] − [π(1 − αb)+( 1− π)αb]K(m,l)
=( 2 αb − 1)(2π − 1)K(m,l). (7)
Let Vx,y(α)=( 2 π − 1)(2α − 1)K(x,y). (Note that Vh,m(α)=V (α)a n dVm,l(α)=
V (m|l,α).) It follows that at the bid-for-h stage, teams from league a value h at
V (h|m,αa,αb) and teams from league b value h at V (h|m,αb,αa), where
V (h|m,αj,αj0)=Vh,m(αj)+Vm,l(αj0). (8)
Here, the last term represents the amount saved from not having to pay for an m
player in the bid-for-m stage. Note that V (h|m,αa,αb) >V(h|m,αb,αa) if and only if
αa > αb.M o r e o v e r ,V (h|m,αj,αj0) is increasing both in αj and in αj0.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
the best response to any revenue sharing rule by the other league is to set one that is
ε higher (since once they have h they want to minimize his price). As a result, there
can be no equilibrium in which either league chooses α < ¯ α(π).
Can we have an equilibrium in the (¯ Ha,¯ Hb) region? Here, none of the teams wants
to bid for h in the ﬁrst stage. Consequently, that auction is declared deserted, and
the teams proceed to the m auction.18 Note that unless αa = αb, both ms will end
up in the same league. Without loss of generality, assume that league a gets the two
ms. Then, in the next stage, the two teams from a bid to attract h.19 After that, the
two teams from b bid for the m of the team from a which got h.
17The ﬁrst term represents the expected gain of a m-team given that the opponent is a l-team,
the second term represents the expected gain of a l team given that the opponent is a m-team. The
v a l u eo fg e t t i n gt h er e m a i n i n gm is the diﬀerence between the two.
18The result would be unchanged, if we assigned the h player randomly to one of the teams ﬁrst
a n dt h e np r o c e e d e dw i t ht h em auction.
19h is now valuable for teams from a since they know that they will be in a (h,m) - l e a g u ei fo n e
of them attracts h.
13Note that because of the Bertrand competition, the winner and the loser of either
auction is going to have the same expected payoﬀ. Thus, the additional revenue an
m (obtained in the ﬁrst auction) generates is the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ of the
m- t e a mi na n( h,m)-league and the l- t e a mi na n( m,l)-league:
W(αa)=[ αa(1 − π)+( 1− αa)π](K(h,m) − K(m,l)).
Note that the function W(α) is decreasing in α. Hence, we expect that in the bid
for-m s t a g e ,t h el e a g u ew i t ht h el o w e rα gets the ms.
If αa < αb, the expected payoﬀ of league a is then
P(αa,αb)=K(h,m) − 2W(αb) − Vh,m(αa).
This can be rewritten as
P(αa,αb)=2 ( 2 π − 1)(αb − αa)K(h,m)+2 [ π + αb(1 − 2π)]K(m,l).
Conversely, if αa > αb, the expected payoﬀ of league a is K(m,l)−Vm,l(αa). (League
b gets the two msi nt h eﬁrst stage and one team from league a buys an m later at
the price Vm,l(αa)). Clearly, league a is better oﬀ with αa < αb than αa > αb.
So, we can now analyze the game played by the two leagues and show that there
is no equilibrium in ( ¯ Ha, ¯ Hb). Note that for any αb < α∗(π), there is no αa such
that (αa,αb) ∈ ( ¯ Ha, ¯ Hb) and league a gets the msi nt h eﬁrst stage. Consequently,
in such a case league a’s payoﬀ is K(m,l) − Vm,l(αa). On the other hand, deviating
to αa =1 /2g i v e st h el a r g e rp a y o ﬀ of K(m,l). This implies that there cannot be an
equilibrium with αb < α∗(π). By a symmetric argument, there cannot be an equilib-
rium with αa < α∗(π) either. Next, note that when both revenue sharing parameters
are above α∗(π), it is always possible to deviate and undercut the opponent with an
α ∈ ( ¯ Ha, ¯ Hb). We deduce that there cannot be an equilibrium in ( ¯ Ha, ¯ Hb)( e x c e p ta t
(α∗,α∗), of course). •
A crucial assumption for the result of Proposition 2 is the unrestricted movement
of players between leagues. In practice such a “freedom” of movement is very recent.
14It followed the 1995 Bosman Ruling. It is interesting to note that in France, until the
season 1998-1999, full revenue sharing was the rule that that the league switched to
a performance-based reward scheme as of the season 1999-2000.20 Taking decision-
making lags into account, it is thus reasonable to assume that the new reward scheme
was introduced as a result of the greater player mobility.
From Proposition 2, we deduce the following corollary.
Corollary 1 There is never full revenue sharing in any sub-game perfect equilibrium.
In fact, whenever
2(1 − π)[K(m,l)+K(h,m)] ≥ K(m,m), (9)
the unique equilibrium is fully dependent on performance (winner takes all).
Proof: As we have shown in the proof of Proposition 2, there can be no equilib-
rium (not even asymmetric) in which either league chooses α < ¯ α(π). Since we have
also shown above that ¯ α(π) > 1/2, the ﬁrst result is already established. We have also
seen (in the proof of Proposition 2) that ¯ α(π) = 1 implies a unique equilibrium with
two winner-takes-all leagues. Now, ¯ α(π)=1w h e nα∗(π) ≥ 1, which is equivalent to
(9). •
Given that the level of revenue sharing chosen in equilibrium is parameter depen-
dent, in the next subsection, we provide a representative parametric example.
4.1 A parametric example
A reasonable way to model the worth of a league, K(.,.), is by the product of some
measure of aggregate talent and a measure of competitive balance. The second can
20It is also worth mentioning that in France, following the Sport Law of July 16, 1984, amended
by the law of July 13, 1992, the league is the owner of the broadcasting rights. As a consequence,
the adoption of a performance-based reward scheme is not the result of rich teams threatening to
sell their broadcasting rights individually if such a performance-based reward scheme is not adopted.
15be proxied by 1 − Pr{stronger team wins}. This captures the value of competitive
balance, since it is decreasing in the diﬀerence in winning probabilities, and gives zero
when one team is sure to win.
Now, let the intrinsic value of talent be given by T(m,l)=1 ,T (m,m)=z
and T(h,m)=z2, with z>1. Then the league worths become K(m,l)=1− π,
K(m,m)=z/2a n dK(h,m)=z2(1 − π). Substituting into (6) we obtain that
α∗(π)=
π(1−π)(1+z2)−z/4
(2π−1)(1−π)(1+z2). It is easy to check that α∗(π) > 1f o rπ < 1− 1 √
8 =0 .646 for
any z consistent with the model.21 Thus, for relatively small competitive imbalance,
for any diﬀerence in talent, fully performance related revenues arise in equilibrium.
For a qualitative picture of the situation w h e nt h ei s s u eo fc o m p e t i t i v eb a l a n c ei s
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Figure 2
As expected, as we increase the value of talent holding competitive balance con-
stant, the case for performance related revenue sharing gets monotonically stronger.
5 Discussion
In this section, we argue that the conclusions based on the analysis of the seemingly
restrictive model of the previous sections are surprisingly(?) robust.
Alternative objective functions
21In order to have K(h,m) >K (m,m), we need z>1/(2(1 − π))
16We have assumed that the objective function of the leagues is to maximize their
domestic aggregate net surplus. This may not be the case in general, since not all
teams incur the cost of hiring talent with equal probability. In this case, teams are
likely to bargain over the fraction of expenses the league should internalize in its
objective function. Consequently, it seems more realistic to assume that the league
will internalize the expenses of the clubs only partially. In other words, the true
objective function of a league is somewhere in between the maximization of joint
revenues and the maximization of aggregate net surplus. However, under this, more
elaborate, hypothesis our results would remain unchanged. The reason is that the
teams’ valuations of h, just as before, are increasing in α. Therefore, full revenue
sharing (i.e., α =1 /2) cannot be an equilibrium.
Other sources of income
We have considered the case in which teams have only one source of income. If
there are multiple sources of income, two cases have to be diﬀerentiated: all incomes
are subject to revenue sharing or some incomes are not subject to revenue sharing.
However, in either case, our results remain unchanged.
If all the sources of income are subject to revenue sharing then an increase in
the sharing of any source of revenue decreases the value of top players for teams.
Therefore, a league choosing α =1 /2 never attracts h. It follows that leagues still
choose performance-based revenue sharing rules in equilibrium.
If some income is not subject to revenue sharing but is increasing in performance,
the value a team is willing top bid for h or for an m is increasing in α. Therefore, our
results remain unchanged: leagues choose performance-based revenue sharing rules.
Asymmetric leagues
The model we consider assumes that revenues from the sale of broadcasting rights
are the same in the two leagues as a function of teams’ quality. This may not be the
case. For example, if the two leagues organize domestic competitions in two countries
of diﬀerent population size, then it is likely that the league of the larger country has
17higher broadcasting revenues for a given quality of the competition. In this respect,
assume that Ka(q1,q 2)=Kb(q1,q 2)+H (H>0). The main diﬀerence with the
previous section is that the value of an m given that the other team from the same
league got h is league dependent. Assume that league a gets h,t h e nVa(m|h,αa) >
Vb(m|m,αb)i se q u i v a l e n tt o
αb ≤
πK(m,l) − 1
2K(m,m)+[ π +( 1− 2π)αa][K(h,m)+H]
(2π − 1)K(m,l)
= fa(αa)
Similarly, Vb(m|h,αb) >V a(m|m,αa)i se q u i v a l e n tt o
αb ≤
πK(h,m) − 1
2[K(m,m)+H]+[ π +( 1− 2π)αa][K(m,l)+H]
(2π − 1)K(h,m)
= fb(αa)




[K(h,m) − K(m,l)]{π[K(h,m)+K(m,l)] − 1
2K(m,m)} + H
2 K(m,l)




Furthermore, fb(1/2) > 1/2. Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 2, this im-
plies that the region (Ha,H b) is non-empty. As a consequence, there is no equilibrium
with full revenue sharing.
Budget constraints
In a previous version of this paper (Palomino and S´ akovics, 2000), we have an-
alyzed a model where there are only two player types but the teams face a budget
constraint. They can only spend on the players an amount that they can surely aﬀord
by the end of the season. The results are similar to those of the current paper. Here
the incentive to keep competing leagues from oﬀering fully performance based rewards
is that the lower the loser’s share is the stricter the budget constraint becomes. In
the limit as the cost of bankruptcy disappears, the only equilibrium is both leagues
oﬀering a winner takes all system.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have analyzed the distribution of broadcasting revenues by sports leagues which
maximize their teams’ joint proﬁt. In the context of an isolated league, we have shown
18that when the teams engage in competitive bidding to attract talent, the league’s
optimal choice is full revenue sharing (resulting in full competitive balance) even if
the revenues depend on the level of competitive balance. This result is overturned
when the league has no monopsony power in the talent market. When the teams of
several leagues bid for talent, the equilibrium level of revenue sharing is bounded away
from the full sharing of revenues: leagues choose a performance-based reward scheme.
These results hold even if teams have multiple sources of income either subject or not
to revenue sharing or if leagues are asymmetric.
We thus provide an explanation of the observed diﬀerences in revenue sharing
rules used by the U.S. sports leagues and European football leagues. In the US, each
league is a monopsonist and splits revenues from national TV deals evenly among
teams. Conversely, in Europe, domestic football leagues compete for talent and,
when TV rights are sold collectively, use a performance-based scheme to redistribute
broadcasting revenues to teams.
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Table 2: Ratio of revenues for the season 1999-2000 is some top European football
leagues. Source: L’Equipe.
England France Germany Italy
1999/2000 402 343 212 596
2000/2001 598 326 399 621
Table 3: Broadcast revenues some top European football leagues (millions of Euros).
Source: Deloitte & Touche Sport Analysis
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